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Peters: Insurance--Escheat--Murder of Insured by Beneficiary Who is Sole
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
Only a few cases have involved a higher court's determination of the duties due to an aeroplane passenger. But, assuming,
in the light of these cases, that certain aircraft should be placed
in the class of "common carriers", the denial of a right to stipulate against damages for negligent injuries would seem proper,"
and would be consistent with the rule prevailing in the United
States, which prevents the ordinary common carrier for hire from
limiting its legal liability for the negligent injury of passengers."

-ROBERT

INSURANCE -

ESCHEAT

WHo Is SOLE DISTRIBUTEE.

W. BtmK.

-

MURDER OF INSURED BY BENEFICIARY

-

A wife, beneficiary under her hus-

band's insurance policy, feloniously killed him and then committed
suicide. Recovery of the proceeds of the policy by husband's
administrator was denied.' The state then brought suit against
the insurance company for the proceeds, on the ground that, insured having left no blood relatives, his wife being his sole distributee, and there being no unpaid creditors of the estate, the
insurance proceeds were derelict and without a rightful owner
and therefore escheated to the state. Upon demurrers of the insurance company tha circuit sustained the bills and certified their
sufficiency to the Supreme Court of Appeals. Held: Reversed; no
absolutely liable for injuries to persons or property on the land or water
beneath, caused by the ascent, descent or flight of aircraft, .... .whether
such owner was negligent or not, unless the injury is caused in whole or in
part by the negligence of the person injured, or of the owner or bailee of
the property injured."
'See, Anderson v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 228 N. Y. 475, 481, 127 N.
E. 584,585 (1920). " ....
if there are those in the business of carrying passengers in the air to-day . . . . who are sufficiently unmindful of their
humanitarian duty as to neglect to employ the utmost care in the selection
and operation of their craft, the industry and the public both will benefit
by the application of a rule of liability -which will either require such care
or ultimately eliminate them from this field of service."
Smith v. O'Donnell, supra n. 4. Note (1933) 83 A. L. R. 357, cites Law v. Transcontinental
Air Transport (1931) U. S. Av. R. 205, as holding that the aeroplane carrier cannot limit its liability by a stipulation in passenger's ticket. See also
4: An Lw JouR
.AL6272
(1933), citing a like New Zealand decision.
HuTcH
soN, LAw oF CARRIERs, op. cit. supra n. 2, § 1072. 'The obligation of a carrier to a passenger for his safe carriage is usually dealt with
as an obligation imposed by the law of torts rather than as one assumed
by contract: and properly, for the obligation is wider than any that could
be based on mutual assent."
2 WILsToN ON CONTRACTS (1920 ed.) § 1113.
'Wickdine

Adm'r v. Ins. Co., 106 W. Va. 424, 145 S. E. 743 (1928).
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escheat accrued to the state. State v. Piwenix Mutual Life Insurance Co.2
The rule seems to have become well settled in this country
that where a beneficiary under a life insurance policy intentionally and wrongfully kills the insured, neither he nor anyone
claiming under or through him can receive any benefit under the
contract of insurance.! This legal conclusion is not necessarily
dependent for its validity upon a bald declaration of "public
policy"; it has often been predicated upon the maxim of the common law that no one may profit by his own wrong,' and it is also
in accord with the well-settled principle applying to all contracts
of insurance that no person insured shall under his contract receive indemnity for a loss that he has himself intentionally brought
about.' The mere fact that the felonious act of the beneficiary
defeats his rights under the policy does not, however, ordinarily
extinguish the obligation of the insurer
This would be the result in the case where the beneficiary procured the taking out of
the policy with the express intention of thereafter killing the insured in order to get the proceeds, of course, as in such a case the
policy is considered void ab initio, being fraudulent in its inception. And sometimes the insurance company is allowed to retain
the proceeds on the theory that the slaying of the insured by the
State v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 170 S. E. 909 (W. Va. 1933).
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591, 6 S. Ct. 877 (1886);
Hewitt v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 8 F. (2d) 706 (C. C. A. 9th,
1925); Johnston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 85 W. Va. 70, 100 S. E.
865, 7 A. L. R. 823 (1919). See also Note (1931) 70 A. L. R. 1539.
ASmith v. Todd, 155 S.C. 323, 152 S. E. 506, 70 A. L. R. 1529 (1930);
Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 79 S.W. 1042, 64 L. R. A. 458 (1903).
rKarow v. Insurance Co., 57 Wis. 56, 15 N. W. 27, 46 Am. Rep. 17 (1883).
"It would be a reproach to the jurisprudence of the country, if one could
recover insurance money payable on the death of a party whose life he had
feloniously taken. As well might he recover insurance money upon a building that he had willfully fired." Field, J., in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, supra n. 3, 600.
Supreme Lodge v. Menkhausen, 209 Ill. 277, 70 N. E. 567, 65 L. R. A.
508 (1904); Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 245 Mass. 565, 139 N.
E. 816, 27 A. L. R. 1517 (1923); Anderson v. Life Ins. Co., 152 N. C. 1,
67 S.E. 53 (1910); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 96 Va. 737, 32 S.
E. 475, 44 L. R. A. 305 (1899); Johnston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
supra n. 3. "The rule of public policy is invoked to prevent the murderer
from profiting - not to relieve the insurer from paying."
Dibell, C., in
Sharpless v. Grand Lodge, 135 Minn. 35, 159 N. W. 1086, L. R. A. 1917 B,
670 (1916).
7Goldstein
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 225 App. Div. 642, 234 N. Y. Supp.
250 (1929); Jack v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 113 Fed. 49 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1902). See discussion of policies void ab initio in Grossman, Liability
and R.qhts of the Insurer When the Death of the Insured is Caused by the
Beneficiary or by a A
Assignee. (1930) 10 BOsTo U. L. RBv. 281, 307.
0
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In all other cases,
beneficiary is an impliedly excepted risk.'
however, the insurer is considered still obligated to pay the proceeds of the policy to some one, as otherwise it is allowed to benefit
by the murder notwithstanding that the event insured against has
plainly taken place.
The personal representative of the insured is now almost
uniyersally allowed to recover the proceeds from the insurance
company on a constructive trust theory,"° except in the case where
the beneficiary is the sole distributee and hence would indirectly
receive the benefit for which he has been denied the direct recovery." It was in order to prevent the insurer from keeping the
proceeds in such a situation that the attempt was made in the
principal case 1 to make the state the beneficiary and raise the constructive trust in its favor. The court was clearly right in refusing to allow this, however, simply on the ground that the state was
a stranger to the transaction and the insurance company was not
enriched at its expense. Nor could the state get the fund by
escheat. The code permits the personal estate of a decedent to
"accrue" to the state only where "there may be no other distributee", and there was another distributee in this case - the wife
of the insured.' It has been suggested, however, that the state
'Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Shane, 98 Ark. 132, 135 S. W. 836 (1911);
Schreiner v. High Court of I. C. 0. of F., 35 Ill. App. 576 (1890).
The life insurance Presidents' Association has now under consideration
the proposal that a special clause be inserted in all life insurance policies
making the murder of the insured by the beneficiary an expressly excepted
risk.
' See cases cited supra n. 6. See also Note (1933) 28 ILL. L. REv. 127,
discussing DeZotell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 245 N. W. 58 (S. D.
2932).
"0Schmidt v. Northern Life Ass'n, 112 Iowa 41, 83 N. W. 800, 51 L. R.
A. 141 (1900); Johnston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra n. 3; POMEROY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 1053.
Johnston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra n. 3; Wicldine v. Ins. Co.,
supra n. 1; McDonald v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 178 Iowa 863, 160 N. W. 289
(1916).
Some courts refuse to make the exception, however. See, for example,
Murchinson v. Murchinson, 203 S. W. 423 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918), allowing
the recovery by the administrator even though it resulted in the murderous
beneficiary getting the proceeds indirectly as sole distributee. See, however,
the language in VANoE, IxsuRANcE (2d ed. 1930) § 601, n. 31. "Possibly
the more pleasing doctrine that bars the murderer, whether claiming under
the policy or the statute, can be justified on the ground that the claim of
the representative is, in its nature, but of a resulting trust; and even a court
of law, recognizing the equitable character of the claim, may refuse to
grant it when by so doing it would confirm to the murderer the fruits of
his crime."
'2State v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra n. 2.
'1W. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 42, art. 2, § 25.
"Query: could the statute be construed to mean, "where there may be
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be allowed to maintain an action for the amount of premiums
paid on the policy or its surrender value.' This notion is open to
the technical objection that by carrying the risk during the period
when premiums were paid the insurer gave value for them. But
as a practical matter, now that the event insured against has occurred, restoring the amount of premiums or surrender value
would still leave the insurer in a relatively favored position.
It should be noted that West Virginia now, as do some other
states,"0 has a statute7 which apparently will settle most of the
future cases. The legislature has approved the decisions in the
Jo7hnstoe' and Wickline cases, in specifying that the money to
which the murderer would have been entitled, either by descent
or distribution, or by any policy of insurance, "shall go to the
person or persons who would have taken the same if the person
so convicted had been dead at the date of the death of the one
killed, unless by some rule of law or equity the money or property would pass to some other person or persons.''
It is arguable that this language would warrant a different result in a
situation like the principle case since it means that legally there
no other distributee who is qualified to take"? If so, then the state could,
without any more argument, get the proceeds under the escheat statute, the
beneficiary, the sole distributee, having been admittedly disqualified by her
crime.
1Cf.
Note (1932) 6 UT.oF CiNx. L. REv. 469; also Note (1929) 15 CORN.
L. Q. 116.
10IOWA CODE (1927)
§ 12034; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 8734; WYO.
Coup. STAT. ANN. (1920) § 7010; ORE. LAWS (Olson, 1920) § 10140; O-r.A.
Co p. STAT. ANN. (Bunn, 1921) § 11319.
All these statutes render the
proceeds "subject to distribution among the other heirs of such deceased
person" according to the laws of descent and distribution. TEx. REv. CiV.
STAT. (1925) art. 5047, provides that where the beneficiary forfeits his right
by wilfully causing the death of the insured, the nearest relative of the
insured shall receive the proceeds. S. C. Laws, 1924, No. 776, § 2, provides
that the slayers interest shall vest in the estate of the deceased, subject to
the proviso, however, that if the criminal has a child or children who, if
the wrongdoer were dead, would inherit from the deceased, they shall take
the interest in the estate of the deceased which the offending parent would
have taken but for the provisions of the statute.
"W.
VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 42, art. 4, § 2.
3

' Johnston v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., supra n. 3.
"Wickline v. Ins. Co., supra n. 1.
m W. VA. REv. CODE, supra n. 17. The revisers' note points out that the
section is a new one framed to meet a case like Johnston v. Metropolitan

Life Ins. Co., supra n. 3. The rule where the beneficiary has died before the
death of the insured and no other beneficiary has been designated is that
the insured holds the money in trust for the estate of the insured. See
Ryan v. Rothweiler, 50 Ohio St. 595, 35 N. E. 681 (1893), and Bancroft v.
Russell, 157 Mass. 47, 31 N. B. 710 (1892), both cited and approved in
Schmidt v. Northern Life Ass'n, supra n. 10, at 47.
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is no other distributee to take. That should satisfy the escheat
statute. The present statute, in effect, renders the murderer not
a distributee.

INSURANCE -

VACANCY'

CLAUSE

-

-TuxY

M. PETms.

EFFECT

OF

UINHABIT-

FreE. - A, the insurer, gave notice to M,
the insured, to protect his partially burned house from further
damage by fire. Pending the exercise of the option to repair or
pay the loss, a second fire destroyed that part of the house not
previously burned. This occurred after the forty day vacancy
clause had expired. A denied liability for the second fire, but thc
case was submitted to the jury on the theory that notwithstanding
the vacancy of the building, the jury might consider the damages
caused by the second fire and whether or not, under the facts of
this case, A had not waived the provisions of the policy as to
occupancy. Held: The decision for M was based on the ground
that the vacancy clause was not intended to cover an unoccupiable
house. American Central Ins. Co. v. McHose.
There seems to be a paucity of authority. All three of the
known cases, in point, were cited in the opinion. In support of
the principal case, are two Nebraska decisions' based on occupancy
of a dwelling uninhabited because of partial destruction by fire,
could not have been within the contemplation of the parties. The
opposing view is represented by a New Jersey case grounded on
the fact that the insured agreed to ask the company for a permit
in case he desired to vacate the insured property for any cause
longer than the time permitted by the vacancy clause in the policy.
The dissenting opinion, in the principal case effectually disposes of the waiver argument by reference to the federal rule
excluding oral evidence of waiver of written stipulations.' But
it fails to give full weight to another provision of the policy
which was operative in this case, the option of the insurance company to pay the loss or rebuild the property. The result may be
ABmrry DUE TO PRIOR

*66 F. (2d) 749 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933).
2
Schmidt v. Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co., 98 Neb. 61, 151 X. W. 920
(1915); Lancashire Ins. Co. v. Bush, 60 Neb. 116, 82 N. W. 313 (1900).
3 Kupfersmith v. Delaware Ins. Co., 84 N. J. L. 271, 86 AtI. 399, 45 L.

R. A. (N. S.) 847 (1913).
'American Cenfral Ins. Co. v. McHose, supra n. 1, at 752.
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